Interest groups and experts debate the cost of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction, andpolicy-makers do not know whom to believe. IVte confusion stems from differing definitions of costs and divergent assumptions about key uncertainties, especially the role of policy in influencing the long-run evolution of technologies and consumer preferences. Analysis could be more helpful to policy-makers by combining technological explicitness with behavioral realism in hybrid models. With such a model, we demonstrate how GHG reduction cost estimates vary depending on whether the analyst focuses just on the jinancial costs of technologies or combines this with other relevant components of consumer and business preferences, such as option value and consumers' surplus. We also show how this type of model can allow policy-makers to explore the uncertain relationship between policies and the evolution of technologies and preferences, which are critical factors in the long-run cost dynamics of GHG emission reduction. We explore these generic methodological issues with a case study of GHG reduction costs in Canada.
INTRODUCTION
In deciding how and by how much to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, policy-makers need to know the potential cost. But cost estimation is controversial. There are alternative definitions of cost and the evolution of technologies and preferences is a complex and highly uncertain process that can profoundly influence costs in the long-run.
Models to aid GHG policy-making are inevitably wrong in that they cannot possibly incorporate all information and relationships of potential importance, nor accurately depict all uncertainties. But as one modeler' noted, "while all models are wrong, some are more useful." To be more useful, models for costing GHG reduction need to help policy-makers understand the key factors behind divergent cost estimates, in effect sorting out the relative contribution of alternative definitions and long-run cost uncertainties.
Over a decade ago, Grubb (1991) referred to "the missing models" in arguing for the development of a new generation of models that would better inform policy-makers of the critical issues in estimating GHG reduction costs. Returning to the issue a decade later, the same author and co-authors (Grubb, Kohler and Anderson, 2002) noted some significant developments, especially in terms of assessing the relationship between policies that induce technical change and the long-run cost dynamics of GHG reduction. At the same time, these researchers and others (Tol, 1999) noted that cost estimates still diverge widely, in part because of different assumptions about technical change (which is perhaps inevitable) but also because of how costs are defined and depicted in GHG reduction costing models. While we have made great advances in understanding the causes of cost differences, models can go further in helping decision-makers sort out the factors that cause these divergent cost estimates. To the extent that the definition of cost is a significant factor, decision-makers can then test their own definition for its effect on cost estimates.
In this paper, we describe a modeling approach that seeks to meet this need. We start in Section 2 by explaining how alternative definitions of cost lead to the development of models that either ignore significant costs of technical change (bottom-up) or inadequately represent the long-run potential for technical change that reduces costs (top-down). In Section 3, we explain recent modeling innovations that better characterize uncertainties about long-run technical change. In Section 4, we describe the design and parameter estimation of a hybrid model that combines key elements of the alternative modeling approaches. We then apply this model in Section 5 to the estimation of GHG reduction costs in Canada in order to show the extent to which divergent cost estimates are a function of alternative definitions of costs, on the one hand, and uncertainties about long-run technical change, on the other. In the conclusion, Section 6, we point to additional research that can make this modeling approach even more useful to decision-makers, especially with respect to the depiction of long-run uncertainties about technical change and consumer preferences.
ALTERNATIVE COST DEFINITIONS OF GHG REDUCTION
An action to reduce GHG emissions is defined as a change in equipment choice, equipment use rate, lifestyle or resource management practice that changes GHG emissions from what they otherwise would be. Examples are: choosing more efficient light bulbs, turning off unused lights, telecommuting some days of the week, and practicing forestry or agriculture differently. The cost of an action is the difference in costs between the business-as-usual scenario and a world in which the action is undertaken. Unfortunately, analysts apply alternative cost definitions.
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Bottom-up analysis, applied frequently by engineers, physicists and environmental advocates, estimates how changes in the energy efficiency, fuel type or emission controls of equipment, buildings, infrastructure and even landuse practices might lead to different levels of GHG emissions.' Technologies (furnaces, light bulbs, electric motors, vehicles) that provide the same energy service (space heating, lighting, industrial motive force, personal mobility) are generally assumed to be perfect substitutes except for differences in their financial costs and their emissions of GHGs and other pollutants.
When their financial costs (capital and operating) in different time periods are converted into present value using a social discount rate, many current and emerging technologies available for reducing GHG emissions appear to be profitable or just slightly more expensive relative to existing equipment. Bottom-up analyses often show, therefore, that substantial GHG emission reduction can be profitable or low-cost if these low-emission technologies were to increase from their small market share to achieve market dominance. A survey of studies during the past decade shows little evolution in this approach (Lovins and Lovins, 1991; Brown et al., 1998; Krause et al., 2002) .
Many economists criticize the bottom-up approach for its assumption that a single, ex ante (anticipated) estimate of financial cost differences (using the social discount rate) indicates the full social (or welfare) cost of switching technologies (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sutherland, 1996) . Technologies may differ to consumers and businesses in ways that are not represented by this single financial value. We illustrate these differences with the mundane example of purchasing a light bulb.
1. New technologies usually have a higher chance of premature failure than conventional technologies and therefore pose greater financial risk.
There is some probability that ex poste (realized) financial costs will exceed ex ante financial costs for new technologies. New compact fluorescent light bulbs have exhibited higher rates of premature failure than conventional incandescent light bulbs, requiring a higher-thanexpected financial outlay because of early replacement in some cases.
2.
Technologies with longer payback periods (relatively high up-front costs) are riskier if the cumulative probability of failure or accident, or undesired economic conditions, increases over time. Because of the higher purchase cost of compact fluorescent light bulbs, the chance of accidental breakage prior to paying back the initial investment is higher than for an incandescent light bulb.
3.
4.
Two technologies may appear to provide the same service to an engineer but not to the consumer. Many people find compact fluorescent light bulbs to be less than perfect substitutes for incandescent light bulbs in terms of attractiveness of the bulb, compatibility with fixtures, quality of light and timing to reach full intensity, and would pay more to maintain high levels of these nonfinancial attributes.
Not all firms and households face identical financial costs: acquisition, installation, and operating costs can vary by location and type of facility. This heterogeneity means that a comparison of single-point estimates of financial costs may exaggerate the benefits of market domination by a low-GHG technology.
The first two differences relate to option value: the expected gain from delaying or avoiding an irreversible investment while waiting for new information that might lead to a better decision (Pindyck, 1991) . The third difference refers to what economists call consumers ' surplus: the extra value that consumers realize above the financial cost of a particular technology.3 The fourth difference simply acknowledges that a technology may be cheaper than its competitor in one circumstance but more expensive in another.
When consumers and businesses are asked, induced or forced to switch away from a technology they would otherwise have chosen, economists say that the social cost of this switch is the difference in financial costs plus or minus any intangible costs related to option value, consumers' surplus and market heterogeneity .4 By ignoring these values, bottom-up analysts may overestimate the willingness of firms and households to take actions that reduce GHG emissions, and thus underestimate the social cost. Politicians, in contrast, seem to be instinctively aware of these other values, and tend to question claims that GHG emissions can be reduced at little or no cost. In providing only part of the cost picture, the bottom-up approach is less helpful to policy-makers than it could be.5 3. While economists usually limit this concept to consumers, firms might also appreciate one technology over its competitor because of some perceived qualitative advantage -but such an advantage should normally result in a financial benefit (with improved quality of product or more efficient production), which is not the case for final consumers.
4. Economists would also include the monetary value of any differences in externality costs, such as pollution damages, but GHG differences are excluded when technologies are being assessed for their relative cost-effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions. GHGs are therefore not monetized, but other externalities, such as local air pollution, must be included for full social costing.
5. Ironically, with their portrayal of firms and households as one-dimensional financial cost minimizers, bottom-up analysts may be more susceptible than economists to the critique of having a simplistic, "rational-economic-man" view of the world.
Another challenge with the bottom-up approach is that its technologyspecific focus hinders the ability to assess broader macro-economic effects, notably the trade and structural repercussions resulting from changes in energy prices and in turn the prices of intermediate and final products. In this sense, bottom-up models usually provide only a partial equilibrium portrayal of the response to GHG reduction policies. If, however, the cost of GHG reduction is as low as this approach often concludes, or if governments are unwilling to pursue rapid and costly decreases in GHG emissions, then macro-economic feedbacks may be small enough that this partial equilibrium assessment is sufficient.
The alternative, top-down analysis of economists usually relies on historical market data to estimate aggregate relationships between the relative costs and the relative market shares of energy and other inputs to the economy, and links these to sectoral and total economic output in a broader, equilibrium framework (Weyant, 1998) . Elasticities of substitution (ESUB) indicate the substitutability between any two pairs of aggregate inputs (capital, labor, energy, materials) and between energy forms (coal, oil, gas, renewables) within the energy aggregate. Another key parameter in such models, the autonomous energy efficiency index (AEEI), indicates the rate at which price-independent technological evolution improves energy productivity. Relatively high parameter values for AEEI and for energy-related ESUB (a large degree of substitutability between energy and capital, and between GHG-intensive and non-GHG-intensive forms of energy) equate to a relatively low cost of GHG emission reduction. Because these parameters are estimated from real market behavior, as energy prices and energy consumption have changed historically, they are said to reveal the actual preferences of consumers and businesses -and therefore implicitly incorporate losses or gains in option value and consumers' surplus, as well as reflect the heterogeneity of real-world financial cost conditions. With these key response parameters estimated, economists simulate the economy's reaction to an economic instrument -a GHG tax, tradable GHG permits, technology or behavior subsidies, or some combination of these -that increases the relative cost of GHG-intensive technologies and behavior. The magnitude of the economic signal necessary to achieve a given GHG reduction target provides the implicit marginal cost of that target. Because top-down models usually integrate energy supply and demand within a total economy model, this marginal cost includes the feedback between energy supply and demand, on the one hand, and between these components and the economy as a whole, on the other. Since movement away from current technologies includes all intangible value losses, top-down analysis usually generates substantially higher estimates of GHG reduction costs.6
The top-down approach is, however, also vulnerable to the criticism of being unhelpful to policy-makers. Substantial reduction of GHG emissions, in order to eventually stabilize atmospheric concentrations, is a long-run objective that requires dramatic technological change over a lengthy period in which consumer preferences are also likely to evolve. Policy-makers need to know if and how their policies can influence both long-run technological change, and thus the ex ante and ex poste financial costs of technologies, as well as the longrun evolution of consumer preferences in ways that reduce these intangible losses from switching to less GHG-intensive technologies.
The key top-down parameters, ESUB and AEEI, are usually estimated from historical data. Even if the confidence intervals of these estimated parameters are narrow, there is no guarantee that values derived from past experience will remain valid into the future (Grubb, Kohler and Anderson, 2002) . Financial costs and consumer preferences change over time, and the magnitude and direction of this change may be influenced by policy.
Until recently, there was no incentive to design and commercialize low-GHG technologies. Now, such technologies are under development worldwide and as research, development and production expands -aided by government policy -economies of scale and economies of learning reduce financial costs and can reduce option value risks, perhaps dramatically (Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1998; Grubler, Nakicenovic and Victor, 1999) . The market penetration of these new technologies and their falling costs imply higher future values for ESUB and AEEI, reflecting the economy's increasing ability to reduce GHG emissions at lower costs.
A similar logic applies to historical estimates of consumers' surplus losses. A typical pattern in new technology commercialization is an initial phase of slow market penetration, limited to acquisition by early adopters, followed by a market transformation phase in which expanding public awareness and acceptance precipitates a cycle of product improvement, intensified marketing effort and accelerating dissemination. This shift in consumer preferences means lower consumers' surplus losses from technology switching, implying that the long-run social costs of GHG reduction may be partially influenced by policy (Norton, Costanza and Bishop, 1998) . Again, this would cause higher values for 6. Historical data generate relatively low values for the economy's willingness to substitute away from GHG-intensive technologies and activities, in part because full long-run price responses are difficult to detect in an ever-changing world. Experts can judgmentally change the AEEI or parameter values to generate low cost estimates, simply by portraying consumers and businesses as more prone to switch technologies in response to changes in financial costs -in effect, reducing the estimated option value losses, consumers' surplus losses and market heterogeneity that otherwise explain technological inertia (Manne and Richels, 1994) . the all-encompassing ESUB and AEEI parameters of top-down models, and thus lower costs of GHG reduction.
Returning to the light bulb example, the growing cumulative production of compact fluorescent light bulbs has reduced their production cost and market price over the past decade, which in turn has shortened investment paybacks and decreased the financial risks from premature breakage. Manufacturers have also improved the reliability and attractiveness of compact fluorescents (appearance, size, hue) so that they are now closer substitutes to incandescent light bulbs. Does this mean that the household market for light bulbs is on the verge of a market transformation in which compact fluorescent light bulbs overtake and marginalize incandescent light bulbs? It might. But an important caution is that low-GHG technologies are not guaranteed falling financial costs and growing consumer acceptance. Experienced marketers of new products are well aware of the difficulty of predicting financial cost reductions and future consumer preferences; the experience of every new technology differs. If the general trend of technological evolution, however, is for new technologies to increase the ability and willingness of consumers and businesses to opt for low-GHG choices -as is likely -then AEEI and ESUB values will increase and the long-run costs of GHG emission reduction will fall.
The importance of technological change for estimating future costs raises another challenge for the top-down approach in terms of its usefulness to policy-makers. Because conventional top-down analysis conceives of technological change as an abstract, aggregate phenomenon -characterized by ESUB and AEEI parameter values -it only helps policy-makers assess top-level policy instruments -such as taxes and tradable permits. But policy-makers often prefer technology-and building-specific policies in the form of tax credits, subsidies and regulations.7 Indeed, energy-environment policies in recent years have extended beyond a technology and building focus to include investment in transportation infrastructure, land-use zoning and other major determinants of the long-run evolution of urban form. Figure 1 depicts this hierarchy of energyrelated decisions in which an emerging attention to community energy management is added to the more traditional policy focus on buildings and equipment (Jaccard, Failing and Berry, 1997) . A model is more useful to policymakers if it can assess the combined effect of these focused policies with aggregate or economy-wide applications of taxes and tradable permits, something that conventional, aggregated top-down models are unable to do. In summary, the top-down and bottom-up approaches offer competing cost definitions, both of which have their failings in terms of usefulness to policy-makers. The bottom-up approach ignores option values and consumer preferences. The top-down approach incorporates these cost factors -at an aggregate level -but ignores the potential for long-run changes to them as technology-specific and economy-wide policies stimulate technical change and perhaps shifting consumer preferences.
A more useful policy costing model, therefore, would be both technologically explicit and behaviorally realistic -simulating the economy's long-run urban form, building and equipment stock turnover as a function of policies that target technological innovation and business and consumer preferences, while incorporating feedbacks between energy supply and demand, and between the energy system and the structure and output of the economy. We refer to this type of policy costing tool as a hybrid model because of its intent to bridge the top-down / bottom-up schism (Jaccard, Bailie and Nyboer, 1996; Jacobsen, 1998; Bohringer, 1998; Koopmans and te Velde, 2001) .
In Figure 2 , we characterize policy models in terms of three key attributes: technological explicitness, preference incorporation and equilibrium feedback. By this latter term, we mean the feedback between the economy and both energy supply and demand.8 8. A more ambitious definition of equilibrium feedback includes the relationship between the energy-economy system and the climate. A new generation of integrated models takes this approach (Kolstad, 1998) . Conventional bottom-up models do well in terms of technological explicitness, but not in terms of the other two attributes. However, there are some types of bottom-up models that also perform fairly well in terms of equilibrium feedback by integrating energy supply and demand, and in a few cases by including interactions between this integrated energy system and the economy as a whole (Nystrom and Wene, 1999) . Conventional top-down models, such as energy-economy, computable general equilibrium models, perform well in terms of preference incorporation and equilibrium feedback, but not in terms of technological explicitness -nor in terms of portraying the potential dynamics of technological innovation, cost reduction and preference shifting (Peters, Ackerman and Bernow, 1999) .
A hybrid model would perform well in terms of technology and preferences, and should also include substantial energy-economy feedback. Figure 2 situates the CIMS model, the hybrid that we describe and apply in later sections of this paper. 9 Because this type of hybrid model can portray decision 9. CIMS originally stood for Canadian Integrated Modeling System but as the model is now being applied to other countries the acronym is now used as a proper name.
58 / The Energy Journal making in different ways -including or excluding option value and consumers' surplus losses -it can help policy-makers understand the contribution of differences in cost definitions to differences in cost estimates. We illustrate this in later sections.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT LONG-RUN COST DYNAMICS
Even if the definition of costs were not in dispute, the challenge of GHG emission reduction presents enormous uncertainties that can result in widely divergent cost estimates. For a given country, three broad categories of uncertainty stand out. 2. Uncertainty about technological innovation, and its implications for future financial costs, increases as the time horizon is extended. Over a 10 -30 year timeframe, dramatic technological change may occur with equally dramatic implications for the financial cost of GHG reduction policies. For example, innovations that reduce the cost of converting fossil fuels into hydrogen, while sequestering safely underground the CO 2 byproduct, raise the prospect of accelerated commercialization of GHG-free, hydrogen-based technologies like fuel cells. The financial costs of such technologies are not independent of public policy, although the relationship is highly uncertain.
3. Uncertainty about consumer and business preferences increases as the time horizon is extended. How might these preferences change as environmental awareness, income, available technologies and policy alter over that same 10 -30 year timeframe? Thus, policies that mandate the development and commercialization of hydrogen-based, fuel cell vehicles are likely to influence the marketing efforts of vehicle manufacturers, with a possible effect on the preferences of consumers. Again, the magnitude of this effect is highly uncertain.
The external uncertainty depicted in point 1 is usually addressed by constructing and simulating scenarios that show contrasted but plausible future values for uncertain factors such as the price of internationally traded GHG emission permits or crude oil. lo Our focus in this paper is on the other two sources of uncertainty -points 2 and 3 -as these are at least partially endogenous to the system being modeled.
One approach to addressing these types of uncertainty is to conduct statistical studies that generate confidence intervals around key parameters in a model that approximates the real world. But the critical parameters in climate policy costing models relate to how financial costs and consumer preferences might change as a function of GHG-mitigation policies. Data for estimating these model parameters are only available from past technological and preference conditions (Stavins, 1999) . To be useful to policy-makers, therefore, costing models would preferably indicate the direction, probability and impact of technological changes that influence both the financial costs and consumers' surplus costs of GHG emission reduction -and the extent to which these changes might be influenced by policy.
Much recent research focuses on applying lessons from past technological innovations to new technologies, linking cumulative manufacture and expanded application of a technology to declines in its financial costs, what are referred to as experience curves or learning curves (Grubler, Nakicenovic and Victor, 1999; Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999; Gritsevskyi and Nakicenovic, 2000; Grubb, Kohler and Anderson, 2002) . For example, as global production of windmills has grown over the past 20 years, the cost of windmill-generated electricity fell quickly at first and today continues gradually down toward an asymptote possibly in the range of (U.S.) $O.O4/kWh. Researchers suggest that low and zero emission vehicles will exhibit a similar declining cost pattern over the next 20 years. But the slope of the experience curve and its asymptote are uncertain and unique for each new technology. To address this uncertainty, researchers group technologies according to common attributes (scale, modularity, thermodynamic limits, special material requirements) in the hope of accurately estimating the long-run cost evolution of each emerging technology. With increasing market experience, parameter values (slope of declining cost with output, likely asymptote value) can be adjusted and confidence intervals narrowed.
Of equal importance is the uncertain relationship between the introduction of new technologies and the preferences of consumers and businesses. To address this uncertainty, researchers apply discrete choice methods to relate past preferences to certain technology attributes in what is called revealed preference research. Estimated confidence intervals provide an indication of uncertainty. But for new technologies there is no past market behaviour, so discrete choice researchers must instead ask consumers and businesses to make choices between new or even hypothetical technologies with different bundles of attributes, what is called stated preference research (Train and Atherton, 1995 ). An example is to ask consumers to make a choice from among a set of vehicles that vary in terms of acceleration, refueling time, fueltype, emissions and range. Confidence intervals from this research indicate uncertainty, but may be biased or imprecise given that the choices are hypothetical.
Uncertainty internal to the system being modeled, therefore, is related both to the long-run dynamic between technology commercialization and financial costs, on the one hand, and between technology commercialization and preferences, on the other. By explicitly representing technologies and realistically portraying consumer and business behavior, researchers can structure hybrid models to address both of these critical aspects of uncertainty. In the following sections, we show how the CIMS hybrid model can be used to help policy-makers understand the relative importance of key technological and behavioral uncertainties for the estimates of long-run GHG reduction costs, especially by applying the results of discrete choice research.
DESIGN AND PARAMETER ESTIMATION OF A HYBRID MODEL
Over the past 15 years, our research group 11 has developed and applied models that portray technological change by simulating the turnover of equipment as a function of both financial costs and other technology attributes that influence the preferences of consumers and businesses. Our current model, CIMS, is an integrated model that simulates the interaction of energy and the output of key sectors of the economy. Each of its three modules -energy demand, energy supply and macro-economy -can be run individually or deactivated while the other modules run. A model simulation iterates between modules until energy price changes fall below a threshold value, and repeats this iteration in each subsequent five-year period of a complete run.'2 CIMS explicitly tracks the evolution of equipment stocks as driven by the demand of the services they provide: for instance, projections of personkilometres-travelled indicates the demand for personal mobility equipment (cars, buses, transit), and tonnes-of-newsprint indicates newsprint producing equipment stocks. Technological change occurs as new equipment stocks replace retired stocks and meet growth in service demand. Equipment retirement is primarily a function of age, although premature retrofit (even total replacement) of existing equipment can occur in response to extreme changes in economic conditions. Service demands grow or decline depending on the interplay of
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12. Our convergence procedure follows that of the NEMS model of the US Department of Energy.
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/ 61 CIMS' macro-economic module with its energy supply and demand modules. Acquisition of new equipment in each time period is the difference between total service requirement and the service output of residual (unretired) equipment stocks.
The following equations depict CIMS' simulation of the technology competition when new equipment stocks are required, as a function of Zife-cyclecosts defined in a unique way.13 The MS kt function is a logistic curve whose slope is determined by a variance parameter, v. A high value for v, such as 100, means that the technology with the lowest life-cycle-cost captures almost all of the new equipment stocks, as would occur with a conventionally-applied linear programming model. An extremely low value for v, such as 1, means that new equipment market shares are distributed almost evenly between all competing technologies, even if their life-cycle-costs differ significantly. Thus, v represents sensitivity of the technology competition to relative life-cycle-costs.
Life-cycle-costs of an individual technology, k, are defined as annualized capital costs (up-front costs) divided by output, plus the per-unit, non-energy and energy operating costs. Different definitions for capital cost can be selected. If capital cost is restricted to the ex ante financial cost of equipment acquisition and installation, and r is set at the social discount rate, LCC represents the conventional value used in bottom-up analysis. However, the CIMS user can specify a different value for r for every technology competition, and capital costs can be defined to include an intangible cost, i, that represents estimated option value costs and/or consumers' surplus losses associated with a technology relative to its prime competitor, as in equation 3.
CC, = FC, + i,

where:
FC,, = financial cost of technology k at time t, lkt = intangible cost factor of technology k at time t.
The higher the value for r, the greater the competitive disadvantage for technologies with a higher capital-to-operating-cost ratio. The higher the value of i, the greater the disadvantage of a technology relative to its alternatives.
These three equations characterize in general CIMS' simulation of the technology competition for new equipment stocks, but there are other functions and constraints to be aware of.
. Service demands are in a hierarchy in which demand for lower level services are a linear function of the demand for higher services, linked in a service flow model. I4 Total steam output in pulp and paper mills depends on the aggregate steam required by all pulping technologies.
. A maximum or minimum market share constraint can be applied to any technology. A maximum market share for natural gas space heating ensures that this technology does not penetrate beyond the plausible extension of the natural gas distribution system.
. A declining capital cost function, if activated, links a new technology's capital cost in future periods to its achieved market share in the previous period. This allows the user to apply information on the relationship between a new technology's cumulative production and the evolution of financial costs -the learning curve or experience curve mentioned above. The model user can also apply this declining cost function to the intangible cost factor in equation 3, thereby relating both future financial costs and the future preferences of consumers and businesses to levels of market penetration.
The parameters v, r and i are critical to the simulation of technology competition, especially with respect to the definition of cost. To replicate the bottom-up approach, v would be set at 100 (winner-take-all), r at the social discount rate and i at zero, ensuring that the technology with the lowest financial cost (at the social discount rate) captured all new technology stocks. Also, the macro-economic module would be de-activated if the intention were to reproduce the partial-equilibrium perspective of much bottom-up analysis. With a hybrid model such as CIMS -technologically explicit, behaviourally realistic -these three parameters must characterize the estimated real-world preferences of consumers and businesses, and the potential for these preferences to evolve under certain policies. As a forward-looking exercise, this estimation process inevitably involves a great deal of uncertainty.
For setting v, our general approach has been to ask experts for a range of values that can be tested by sensitivity analysis. Our default value for v is 10, meaning that where a technology has an LCC advantage of at least 15 % over its competitor(s) it would capture at least 80% of new stock. As the L C C differential gets smaller, the market shares are more evenly split.15
14. This is comparable to the reference energy system in an integrated optimization model (Nystrom and Wene, 1999) .
15. We are currently reviewing market research that shows how cost sensitivity varies by type ofdecision-maker (business vs. consumer) and even by income. In future, we expect to use a slightly higher value for the industrial, energy supply and freight transportation sectors, and a slightly lower value for decisions by final consumers.
For setting r and i, we review the literature on discrete choice research that estimates the revealed and stated preferences of consumers and businesses for certain technology attributes, namely payback for I and other qualities like consumers' surplus for i. Nyboer (1997) provides a summary of our default values for r, many of which were derived from the survey research of Train (1985) . The default value for i is zero. However, there are numerous cases in which discrete choice research suggests a specific value for i, as when comparing new vehicle technologies to conventional ones (Bunch et al., 1993) . Also, we sometimes use i as a calibration parameter when the values for v and r are inadequate for simulating the historical penetration rate of certain technologies, like high efficiency buildings or industrial cogeneration.
With its v, r and i set to reflect market behavior, one might expect a CIMS simulation to replicate that of a top-down model, especially if its macroeconomic module is activated. This is a possible outcome. But if CIMS includes new technologies, and if these technologies imply different ESUB and AEEI values for the future simulation period, then CIMS would not replicate the topdown model. Likewise, if CIMS' declining capital cost function is activated for new technologies, there could be an even greater divergence of ESUB and AEEI between the hybrid and the top-down approach. Over a relatively short time period of 10 years, however, the market penetration of new technologies and subsequent decrease in their capital costs has little time to influence technology choices, meaning that a CIMS simulation and a top-down simulation would be quite similar.
In the next section, we present the results from our recent application of CIMS to estimating the cost of GHG emission reduction in Canada. We only present those elements of this application that demonstrate how a hybrid model can provide useful information to policy-makers about the relative role of alternative cost definitions and assumptions about uncertain long-run cost dynamics to the divergent estimates of GHG emission reduction costs. A more detailed description of this exercise is provided in Analysis and Modelling Group (2000) and Jaccard et al. (2003) .
HYBRID MODEL APPLICATION: ESTIMATING CANADIAN GHG EMISSION REDUCTION COSTS
In 1998, Canadian federal and provincial governments established the National Climate Change Process to cost options for achieving Canada's GHG emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (2010 emissions at 6 % below 1990 levels). Consultative research groups were established to provide technical and economic information about key GHG reduction actions. This information was passed to two technologically-explicit energy-economy models. CIMS was operated as a hybrid model with some adjustment of its default behavioral parameters to match the data and expert judgment provided by the research groups. The other model, MARKAL, was applied as an integrated, bottom-up optimization model. Both of these models were required to de-activate their macro-economic modules, instead passing their detailed sectoral results for investment and operating costs to a macro-economic model that estimated the total effect on the Canadian economy. National cost estimates were then generated for several scenarios which differed in terms of (1) the allocation of the reductions among sectors, (2) the allocation of reductions between domestic actions and purchases of international credits, and (3) the comparison of a single, economy-wide policy instrument -such as an emissions cap with tradable permits -with a package of technology-and sector-specific policies (Analysis and Modelling Group, 2000) .
We report here the hybrid modeling results from the scenario in which the Kyoto target is applied nationally. Canada achieves the target via domestic actions alone, and does so using some technology-and sector-specific policies in concert with an economy-wide emissions cap and tradable permit policy. The specific policies include subsidies, regulations, research and development, and information programs (demonstrations, labeling, audits). Efficiency standards are tightened for building shells, heating and cooling equipment, vehicles, appliances, lighting, and some industrial equipment. Land-use zoning and planning policies improve the prospects for district heating, cogeneration, and integrated residential and commercial development that reduces travel requirements. Subsidies foster renewable electricity technologies, fuel cell applications, ethanol use by vehicles, public transit infrastructure, changes to agricultural and forestry practices, and development of CO 2 capture and storage techniques. The economy-wide tradable permit policy is designed to minimize distributional impacts, meaning that permits are primarily allocated according to current emission levels, with some adjustments to reflect significant differences in the marginal costs of GHG reduction.
Under the business-as-usual scenario, emissions were expected to be about 25 % higher than 1990 levels by 2010, implying a reduction from projected levels of more than 30% in just 10 years. This scale of reduction requires a dramatic market shift to low-GHG technologies, absorbing all opportunities offered by the natural turnover of equipment stock and even forcing some premature switching to alternative fuels in electricity generation and vehicles, and intensive retrofitting of building shells. Given the values of the behavioral parameters in a hybrid model, significant price changes are required to motivate the actions required during the tight lo-year timeframe between 2000 and the Kyoto deadline of 2010. Thus, the CIMS hybrid simulation of this scenario suggests that a GHG tradable permit price of $150/t CO,e would result from the national emissions cap that achieves the Kyoto target.16 This translates into substantial price increases for retail energy commodities -50% for gasoline, 40 to 90 % for natural gas, and 5 to 100% for electricity depending on the regional generating system (hydro-or thermal-based). In aggregate, about 40% of the GHG reduction results from increased energy efficiency while 30 % results from fuel switching, this latter occuring especially in the electricity sector. The net costs of these adjustments translate into a reduction in cumulative economic growth of about 3 %, the equivalent of a one-year recession between 2000 and 2010.
Estimating the Role of Alternative Cost Definitions
The different scenarios for the required level of domestic GHG reduction provided data from which we constructed an approximate GHG emission reduction cost curve for both the CIMS hybrid simulation and a bottom-up analysis by MARKAL, conducted for the National Climate Change Process, as shown in Figure 3 (Jaccard et al., 2003) . While the bottom-up curve in this figure was generated using MARKAL, it could equally have been produced from running CIMS in bottom-up mode -which would have required the previously mentioned bottom-up values for parameters v, r and i. Test simulations show, however, that a bottom-up application of CIMS will produce a slightly higher cost curve than with MARKAL because CIMS does not replicate an optimization model's perfect foresight about future energy supplydemand conditions.
The two curves provide decision-makers with information on the role of alternative cost definitions in explaining divergent cost estimates. The hybrid curve indicates positive costs at relatively low levels of emission reduction while the bottom-up curve suggests that up to 60 MT of reduction provide net benefits and that even at 120 MT the total costs are offset by total benefits. These cost estimates were generated using the same ex ante financial costs and other characteristics of technological options, an identical macro-economic forecast, and the same macro-economic model to simulate economic feedbacks. Both simulations draw on similar actions, with the electricity and transportation sectors responsible for much of the GHG emission reduction. But the bottom-up application defines costs as only ex ante financial costs (at the social discount rate) while the hybrid simulation defines costs as financial costs plus any losses or gains in option value and consumers' surplus when switching technologies and changing behavior. These alternative definitions result in dramatically different cost estimates.
16. C02e stands for CO? equivalent, which converts all GHGs into units of CO? in terms of their greenhouse gas effect. All monetary values are in Canadian dollars unless stated otherwise (at $1 Cdn. = $0.65 US). Earlier analysis indicated a price of $120 / t CO 2 but the $150 results from later research in which we included some consumers' surplus losses that had been under-represented in the information about transportation actions that was initially provided to us and other modellers. 
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To check our hybrid modeling method, we compared the CIMS simulation results with those of the US government's NEMS model, one of the few models that satisfy our hybrid definition of technological explicitness, behavioral realism and macro-economic feedbacks. In an application of NEMS to estimate the impacts of the US Kyoto commitment, a carbon tax (or tradable permit price) of 294 US $ / tonne of carbon was required to reduce emissions in 2010 to 3 % below their 1990 levels (US Energy Information Administration, 1998). The 3 % reduction is comparable to Canada's Kyoto target, because at these targets both studies exclude the effect of augmenting forestry and agricultural sinks. When the US carbon tax is converted to Canadian currency and from carbon to CO,e, it equals about $125 Cdn. / t CO,e. While the costs for the two countries are similar, our CIMS estimate for Canada is slightly higher at $150 / t CO,e. One important difference between the two countriesthat may explain this modest cost difference -is that the significant role of coal in the US electricity system offers lower cost opportunities for emission reduction relative to Canada, whose electricity system is more than 50% provided by hydropower. Figure 3 does not show the cost curve for the conventional top-down modeling approach, but our tests show that this curve would only be slightly higher than the hybrid curve. This is because the tight l0-year timeframe of the simulations does not provide sufficient time for the declining capital cost function (experience curves) and behavioral change potential in CIMS to have much effect on costs and technology market shares. Over a longer timeframe, however, one would expect the hybrid cost curve to move downward in response to policies that induce technical change. We explore this issue in the next section.
Estimating the Potential for Long-Run Cost Dynamics
Existing urban form, infrastructure, buildings, energy supply facilities and energy-using equipment cause energy demand inertia in the short-and even medium-term. This inertia increases the costs of achieving quick GHG reductions. Our modeling runs showed that a 30% reduction of Canadian GHG emissions from their business-as-usual trend within 10 years requires that new, low-GHG technologies capture virtually all new building and equipment stocks as well as replacing, by retrofit or premature retirement, significant portions of stocks that could otherwise have continued to provide valuable service for years and even decades. Over longer time periods, however, the cost of GHG emission reduction falls as actions can then occur at the same rate as capital stock turnover -provided that decision-makers have enacted policies that motivate the adoption of the lowest GHG-emitting technologies.
Because they explicitly keep track of capital stocks, bottom-up and hybrid models can show how costs fall as the timeframe is extended. Top-down models can also show this if they are dynamic models that simulate the effects of capital stock turnover (Jacoby and Wing, 1999) .
However, as the timeframe extends further into the future, the character of technical change plays an increasingly important role in determining the costs of GHG reduction. While there have been some efforts with top-down models to simulate long-run technical change, this potential is limited by the portrayal of such change via the parameters AEEI and ESUB. How does the top-down modeler translate new information about the cost of renewable electricity generation or high efficiency lightbulbs into their parameter estimates for AEEI and ESUB? How does the modeler show the policy-maker the relationship between technology-focused R&D policies and these same parameters?
In contrast, the last decade has witnessed a flurry of technologyexplicit, bottom-up modeling of technical change. In the bottom-up framework, the analyst can make projections about the declining financial costs of emerging technologies as they penetrate the market, assume a rate of diffusion, and then calculate the resulting GHG reductions and ex ante financial costs (International Energy Agency, 2001 ). Bottom-up modelers can also link the future financial costs of these new technologies to policy initiatives, such as R&D subsidies, in what is called endogenous modeling of induced technical change (Grubb, Kohler and Anderson, 2002) . This explicit treatment of technologies also allows modelers to estimate the value to policy-makers of policies that increase our knowledge of potential GHG reducing technologies (Papathanasiou and Anderson, 2001) .
But the very criticisms of bottom-up modeling that motivated the development of hybrid modeling approaches apply equally to the exploration of long-run technical change. Uncertainty about emerging technologies concerns not just the diversity of views on their future ex ante financial costs (the slope of their experience curves), but also uncertainty about the willingness of consumers and businesses to embrace any particular technology as its costs fall and awareness of it increases.
An example is the choice of technology for providing personal mobility in the urban areas of industrialized countries. Emerging substitutes for the conventional vehicle driven by a gasoline-fueled internal combustion engine include replacing gasoline with ethanol, adopting battery-gasoline vehicles, adopting hydrogen-fuel-cell vehicles and switching to public transit. Bottom-up modeling of induced technical change could show a substantial decrease in the ex ante financial cost of public transit relative to the alternatives, but this would mislead policy-makers if it had dramatically underestimated the reluctance of urbanites to switch away from personal vehicles. A similar concern applies to many of the new technologies that are now being applied to estimate the longrun costs of GHG reduction."
Recently, however, some researchers have begun to address the challenge of integrating consumer response into the modeling of technologyfocused policies to induce technical change. Duke and Kammen (1999) linked financial cost experience curves with demand responses for three emerging energy choices: photovoltaics, efficient lights and ethanol. While their characterization of the demand response was relatively simplistic -an assumption of unitary own-price elasticity for photovoltaics and efficient lights in concert with an exogenous demand growth rate -their innovative approach should stimulate more comprehensive modeling of the supply-demand responses to policies that induce technical change. This is the direction that we are pursuing in our research. Figure 4 shows two GHG emission reduction cost curves for Canada from simulations of CIMS in which we extended the l0-year timeframe for achieving the 180 MT reduction to 15 and 25 years. As expected, the cost falls substantially as new technologies are able to penetrate the market in step with the normal rate of investment in infrastructure and the natural turnover rate of buildings and equipment. The cost reduction in the 15-year simulation is similar to the declines that a dynamic top-down model would predict -it primarily reflects the cost reductions from avoiding premature retirement of capital. The cost reduction in the 25-year simulation, however, also includes the supplydemand effects of policies to induce technical change. A dynamic top-down model would not predict this cost reduction unless its AEEI and ESUB parameters were exogenously changed. A bottom-up application, using CIMS or MARKAL, would produce similar cost declines for the 15-and 25-year simulations, but these cost curves would be reductions from the bottom-up curve in Figure 3 . In other words, a gap between hybrid and bottom-up cost curves would remain because of their different definitions of costs. But how large would this gap be? 
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To be useful to policy-makers, simulations of policies to induce longrun technical change should provide an indication of how reductions in the ex ante financial costs of technology options might translate into rates of market penetration, the critical issue overlooked by most bottom-up modeling. To this end, we have reviewed the discrete choice literature on energy technology decision-making to extract attribute-specific preference information that can be applied with some confidence to emerging technologies via the behavioral parameters in the CIMS model. We have also undertaken a series of discrete choice surveys in the industrial, buildings and transportation sectors. The 25-year curve in Figure 4 is based on our preliminary findings.
Another aspect of this research is to help policy-makers understand the extent of uncertainty about future costs under hybrid modeling of policies to induce technical change. Using sensitivity analysis, Dowlatabadi (1998) showed how changes to key assumptions can lead to dramatically different outcomes for the cost of GHG reduction. With the hybrid modeling approach, we need to address both the uncertainty around ex ante financial costs and the uncertainty about the evolution of consumer and business preferences. Our current research involves sensitivity analysis, especially with the intangible cost factors in CIMS, as well as the propagation of the probability distributions from our discrete choice research through the model -using Monte Carlo techniques -to generate probability distributions around the model's simulation results. A recently completed research project on personal mobility choices, for example, involved the application of our declining cost function both to ex ante financial costs and to the intangible cost factor in a simulation of the long-run effect of a vehicle emission standard that mandated minimum market shares for categories of vehicles in a manner similar to California's vehicle emission standard.
CONCLUSION
Bottom-up models can be useful to policy-makers by showing the technological possibilities for advancing toward an environmental target, such as reducing GHG emissions. However, these models can also be misleading in that their definition of cost is restricted to a single ex ante estimate of financial costs that ignores possible losses of option value and consumers' surplus by businesses and consumers. Most bottom-up models are also not able to estimate the overall effect of energy-impacting policies on the macro-economy. Top-down models, in contrast, can be useful to policy-makers because they incorporate the preferences of businesses and consumers -in that their parameters are usually estimated from real-world behavior -and connect the energy system to the macro-economy. However, their parameters do not allow for technological change or shifts in preferences, the very levers that policy-makers need to apply if they are to reduce the long-run costs of GHG reduction. Furthermore, the lack of technological disaggregation in such models prevents them from integrating the effects of technology-specific policies with economy-wide policy instruments.
Hybrid models combine the technological explicitness of bottom-up models with the behavioral realism of top-down models. Some hybrids, such as CIMS, also include macro-economic feedbacks as energy price changes affect the prices of intermediate and final goods and services. The parameter values of hybrids can be set to replicate a bottom-up model or a top-down model, demonstrating for policy-makers the role that the definition of cost can play in the diversity of cost estimates. They can also help policy-makers understand the sources of uncertainty in estimating the long-run costs of GHG reduction. These include both uncertainty about technical change and uncertainty about the preferences of businesses and consumers.
